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1 Introduction
The effects of globalization on labor markets have long been a serious concern in public debates.
Admitting that economic globalization could generate large benefits but their distribution may be
uneven both within a country and across countries, international societies recently have stressed that
globalization should be “inclusive”—which means that the benefits of globalization are shared by all
economic agents.1 In the academic literature, the impact of globalization on labor markets has also
been widely studied. One important strand of the literature is the effects of international trade on
wages. Among them, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem that predicts that trade liberalization increases
the relative returns to abundant factors has been intensively studied with respect to its empirical
relevance.2 Another important strand of the literature has explored the impact of globalization on
the responsiveness of employment to changes in wages.
Rodrik (1997), an influential early work on this issue, emphasized that globalization would in-
crease firms’ labor demand elasticities and influence labor markets at least in three respects. First,
higher labor demand elasticities lead to more volatile employment, which decreases job security and
lowers workers’ utility. Second, high labor demand elasticities would decrease workers’ bargaining
power against employers, which may lead to lower wages. Third, higher labor demand elasticities
are likely to make the effect of non-wage costs on wages and employment more serious for work-
ers. Motivated by Rodrik (1997), several empirical studies followed. However, early studies yielded
only mixed results about to what extent trade liberalization would increase the elasticity of la-
bor demand although they often found that the elasticity of labor demand tended to increase over
years (Slaughter (2001), Krishna, Mitra, and Chinoy (2001), and Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy
(2007)). As foreign direct investment (FDI) and international production fragmentation have been
a global trend for these two decades, the impact of globalization on the elasticity of labor demand
has renewed researchers’ interests. Several studies asked whether the subsidiaries of multinational
1For example, in his speech in 2008, Robert Zoellick, the former World Bank Group Presi-
dent said, “Inclusive refers first to the need to make sure that the benefits of growth and glob-
alization are felt throughout societies, that its not just a benefit for certain businesses or cer-
tain professional classes but it runs throughout the system.” (The whole speech is available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21690802 pagePK:34370 piPK:34424 the-
SitePK:4607,00.html)
2A recent example is Chiquiar (2008). He examined changes in skill premium in Mexico caused by NAFTA
and found that regions with a larger exporter to international markets (i.e., regions close to the Mexico-U.S. border)
exhibited a relative increase in wages and a decrease in skill premium, as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
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enterprises (MNEs) had larger labor demand elasticities than indigenous firms (Fabbri, Haskel, and
Slaughter (2003) and Navaretti, Checchi, and Turrini (2003)). Other studies focused on the effects
of outsourcing on labor demand elasticities (Hijzen and Swaim (2010) and Senses (2010)). However,
these recent studies also provided limited evidence on the contribution of offshoring to raising labor
demand elasticities. One difficulty in examining whether globalization would increase labor demand
elasticities is to identify appropriate measures of globalization. For example, a commonly used in-
dex for the degree of outsourcing is the share of imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate
inputs.3 However, this index is obvioulsy endogenous, which implies that to detect the direction
of causality is difficult. For example, because firms with high labor demand elasticities can easily
substitute labor with materials, which might increase the use of imported intermediate inputs.
In this paper, we examine the effects of tariff reductions on labor demand elasticities at the
firm level. The first contribution of this paper is to rigorously examine the causality between trade
liberalization and increases in labor demand elasticities. For this purpose, we construct Chinese firm-
level panel data over the 2000–2006 period and examine the effects of tariff reductions in intermediate
inputs and the final goods. Our sample data correspond to the period of China’s accession to the
World Trade Organization (WTO), and tariffs declined in a broad range of manufacturing sectors at
various speed in the sample period. We exploit this large policy change. In addition, using firm-level
panel data allows us to control for firm-level heterogeneity and capture within-firm changes in labor
demand elasticities.
Our second contribution is to study the firm-level effects of tariff reductions on labor demand
elasticities. The recent heterogenous firm trade literature emphasizes that the degree of interna-
tionalization may vary across firms even within a narrowly defined industry (e.g., Melitz (2003)).
As we show in this paper, tariff reductions may differently affect firms’ labor demand elasticities,
depending on the firm’s internationalization status. More specifically, inspired by Amiti and Davis
(2012) and Kasahara and Lapham (2013), we consider a heterogenous firm model in which firms
may export their products and use imported intermediate inputs by incurring fixed costs. Firms are
heterogenous in their productivity and only productive firms, thus, can export their final products
and use imported intermediate inputs. Our key idea is that given that the elasticity of substitution
3Feenstra and Hanson (1999) introduced this index as a proxy of outsourcing. This index including its variants is
widely used in the empirical trade literature, such as Slaughter (2001), Hijzen and Swaim (2010), and Senses (2010).
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between labor and the composite of intermediate inputs is greater than one, decreases in the price
of the composite of intermediate inputs lead to higher constant-output labor demand elasticities
(more elastic) through lowering the factor share of labor. Productive firms face lower prices of the
composite of intermediate inputs relative to unproductive firms because productive firms tend to
use more varieties of imported intermediate inputs, which lowers the price of the composite of inter-
mediate inputs. Thus, our model predicts that given other things constant, more productive firms
are likely to have more elastic conditional labor demand than unproductive firms. Furthermore, the
effect of tariff reduction in intermediate inputs (input tariff reduction) on conditional labor demand
elasticities is more pronounced for productive firms than unproductive firms. Our empirical study
generally supports these predictions.
The third contribution is to test the effects of outsourcing on labor demand elasticities at the
firm-level. Unlike the existing literature, we directly measure the effect of outsourcing by changes
in input tariffs. To what extent outsourcing would affect domestic labor markets has been a great
concern especially in Asia. International production fragmentation has been a global trend for
decades, becoming especially important in Asia–which Baldwin (2006) called “Factory Asia”, where
the manufacturing process is fragmented into stages and dispersed around the region. Observers now
widely believe that joining global production networks is crucial for a country’s successful economic
development. In this regard, assessing the effects of input and output tariff reductions on labor
demand elasticities is crucial for policy design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework and
derives testable predictions. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 describes our empirical
strategy, deriving the estimated equations. Section 5 reports the estimation results. Section 6
concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Labor demand elasticity
Consider firms competing with other firms in a monopolistically competitive manner. Each firm
faces the following demand function:
Q =
[ p
P¯
]
−η E
P¯
, η > 1, (1)
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where p and Q are the price and quantity of the product, η is the constant product demand elasticity,
P¯ is the industry average price, and E is total expenditure for the differentiated final goods.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that differentiated final goods are
produced by combining labor and the composite of intermediate goods with a constant returns to
scale technology such that Q = ϕF (L,M) where ϕ represents firm specific productivity, L is the
labor input, and M is the composite of intermediate inputs. The composite of intermediate goods
has a form of symmetric CES such that
M =
[∫ n
0
m(j)(γ−1)/γdj
]γ/(γ−1)
, (2)
where m(j) is the amount of intermediate input j used and γ > 1 represents the elasticity of
substation between intermediate inputs. It is assumed that each country produces a continuum of
symmetric intermediate inputs with unit measure. For simplicity, we normalize the factory-gate
price of intermediate inputs to one. Further, firms have to incur an iceberg-type trade cost τm ≥ 1
for each imported intermediate variety while there are no such trade costs for domestic intermediate
inputs. Thus, given that a firm imports intermediated inputs from n countries, the firm’s price of
composite intermediated inputs is given by
Pm =
[∫ 1
0
11−γdj +
∫ n
0
τ1−γm dj
]1/(1−γ)
= [1 + nτ1−γm ]
1/(1−γ). (3)
Note that [1 + nτ1−γm ]
1/(1−γ) < 1 as long as n > 0. Further, the price of composite of intermediate
inputs PM is decreasing in n and increasing in τm.
The firms in the final good sector apply the standard markup pricing rule. Thus, the variable
costs (i.e., the sum of wage bills and payments to the composite of intermediate inputs) is equal to
r(η − 1)/η, where r denotes the firm’s total revenue. Further, we assume that each firm must incur
iceberg trade costs τe to serve a foreign market. Thus, denoting the local price by p, the exporting
price is τep. When the firm ships xe units of the final good to a foreign market, only xe/τe arrive at
the foreign market. Thus, letting xd be the supply for the local market and x(= xe + xd) be total
output, this firm’s total revenue is given by pxd+ τepxe/τe = p(xd+xe) = px. Therefore, the factor
share of labor sL can be expressed by
sL =
FL(L,M)L
F (L,M)
, (4)
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where FL denotes the partial derivative of F with respect to L. Note that sL depends only on the
relative factor prices PM/w because of the homogeneity of the production function.
Since the production technology is linear homogenous, letting l(w,Pm, ϕ) be the unit requirement
of labor, the firm’s labor demand Ld is expressed by
Ld = l(w,Pm, ϕ)Q(p(w,Pm, ϕ)). (5)
Thus, the total labor demand elasticity ηLL is given by
ηLL = −(1− sL)σ − sLη, (6)
where σ represents the elasticity of substitution between labor and the composite of intermediates.4
Equation (6) is the same as the one based on linear homogeneous technology and perfect competition.
As Hamermesh (1993) clarifies as the “fundamental law of factor demand,” equation (6) decomposes
the total labor demand elasticity ηLL into the substitution effect (the first term) and the scale effect
(the second term). The first term, the constant-output labor demand elasticity, suggests that for a
given output level, the total labor demand elasticity increases (more negative) when the elasticity of
substitution between labor and the composite of intermediate inputs, σ, increases and/or the factor
share of labor, sL, decreases. Even σ does not change, the constant-output labor demand elasticity
may vary according to the factor share of labor because a lower labor share implies that the firm
uses more intermediate inputs toward which firms will substitute when the wage rises.
The second term of equation (6) implies that an increase in the wage that the firm faces raises
the unit cost and the firm’s output declines, which leads to the firm’s lower labor demand. It is
quite straightforward that as the factor share of labor decreases, the scale effect on the total labor
demand elasticity will be weakened.
In order to facilitate analysis on the link between firms’ labor demand and trade liberalization,
we specify the production function of the final goods by the following CES form:
Q = ϕ [Lρ +Mρ]
1/ρ
. (7)
4The derivation of equation (6) is relegated to the Appendix. The final good sector is under monopolistic competi-
tion. However, we assume that labor and the composite of intermediate inputs are not used for the fixed cost. Thus,
the elasticity of output with respect to any factor equals its share in output and the rewards to factors exhaust the
total output net to the fixed cost.
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From this specification, we obtain sL as follows:
sL =
1
1 + [1 + nτ1−γm ](1−σ)/(1−γ)
, (8)
where equation (3) is used for w/PM and σ ≡ 1/(1−ρ). If the elasticity of substitution between labor
and the composite of intermediate inputs equals to 1 (i.e., σ = 1), the production function becomes
a Cobb-Douglas, so that sL is 0.5 and independent from the relative factor price PM/w. However,
if σ > 1, the labor share sL is increasing in the relative price of the composite of intermediates.
As is already discussed, the relative price of the composite of intermediates decreases as the mass
of available varieties of intermediate inputs increases (extensive margins) and/or decreases in the
import price of each variety of intermediates (intensive margins).
2.2 Imported intermediates and export
The sequence of firms’ decision making in the final-goods sector follows Melitz (2003). After observ-
ing their specific productivity ϕ which is assigned by a stochastic process when firms are born, the
least productive firms immediately exit from the market. The remaining firms determine whether
they should export as well as whether they should use imported intermediates.
Following Amiti and Davis (2012) and Kasahara and Lapham (2013), it is assumed that firms have
to incur fixed costs to use imported intermediates. Specifically, the fixed costs for using imported
intermediates is measured by units of the numeraire goods and denoted by fm per country. Thus,
profits for a firm that does not use imported intermediates are given by
πd(ϕ) = (w
1−σ + 1)(1−η)/(1−σ)(αP¯ )η−1ϕη−1 − f, (9)
where f denotes a fixed cost that all firms in production have to incur and is measured in the units
of the numeraire goods. Similarly, profits for a firm that does use imported intermediates are given
by
πm(ϕ) = (w
1−σ + P 1−σm )
(1−η)/(1−σ)(αP¯ )η−1ϕη−1 − (f + nfm). (10)
While these fixed costs are common for all firms, the benefit from using imported intermediates
is increasing in ϕ. Equations (9) and (10) suggest that only more productive firms use imported
intermediates and the others use only domestically produced intermediate inputs.
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When exports are allowed, the sorting pattern becomes more complicated. For simplicity, we
consider n symmetric country case. Denoting iceberg-type trade costs by τe and entry fixed costs
by fe, profits for an exporting firm are expressed by
πde(ϕ) = (1 + nτ
1−η
e )(w
1−σ + 1)(1−η)/(1−σ)(αP¯ )η−1ϕη−1 − (f + nfe), (11)
if the firm does not use imported intermediates, and otherwise, the firm earns
πme(ϕ) = (1 + nτ
1−η
e )(w
1−σ + P 1−σm )
(1−η)/(1−σ)(αP¯ )η−1ϕη−1 − [f + n(fe + fm)]. (12)
Firms compare these profits, and choose the most profitable mode. Observing equations from
(9) through (12), it is straightforward to see that the most productive firms use imported interme-
diates and export their products, whereas the least productive firms use only domestically produced
intermediates and serve only the local market. However, sorting patterns for firms in the middle
productivity range depend on parameter specifications and are complicated. Rather than exhaust-
ing all possibilities of the sorting patterns, we here focus on the pattern relevant to our research
interests, namely the link between the labor demand elasticity and trade liberalization (especially
tariff reductions for imported intermediates and the final goods).
2.3 Tariff reductions and the labor demand elasticity
As the preceding literature suggests, trade liberalization may affect the labor demand elasticity
through several channels (e.g., Slaughter (2001)). First, in the monopolistic competition model
considered here, the mass of firms will increase as a result of trade liberalization in the final goods
sector. For example, a decreases in τe (and/or decreases in the final goods tariffs in foreign countries)
will increase the total mass of firms in the final goods sector, which leads to a higher η.5 As a result,
holding other things constant, the total labor demand elasticity will increase (see equation (6)).
Second, trade liberalization may affect the total labor demand elasticity by altering the elasticity
of substitution between labor and the composite of intermediate inputs, σ, and/or the factor share of
labor, sL. In our model, the elasticity of substitution between labor and the composite of intermediate
inputs is exogenously given at σ. However, as is already discussed, given that σ > 1, sL decreases as
the price of the composite of intermediates, Pm, decreases. In our model, decreases in τm obviously
5The iso-elastic demand is an approximation when the number of differentiated varieties is relatively large (Helpman
and Krugman (1985, Ch. 6)).
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lower Pm. Note that sL oppositely works for the scale effect. Thus, whereas tariff reductions in the
intermediate inputs increase the constant-output labor demand elasticity, their effect on the total
labor demand elasticity is ambiguous.
The model suggests that holding output constant, productive firms tend to have more elastic
labor demand than unproductive firms since only productive firms use imported intermediates. Tariff
reductions for intermediated inputs would lower such productive firms’ labor factor share further,
which leads to higher constant-output labor demand elasticities. Thus, the impact of tariff reductions
in intermediate inputs is not universe across firms.
In summary, the model yields the following empirical predictions.
• Holding other things constant, productive firms are likely to have larger constant-output (con-
ditional) labor demand elasticities than unproductive firms.
• Tariff reductions in the imported intermediate goods tend to increase the constant-output
labor demand elasticity by decreasing the factor share of labor. This elasticity increase is
more pronounced for productive firms.
• Whereas tariff reductions in the final goods may increase the total labor demand elasticity by
increasing η, they are not likely to affect the constant-output elasticity.
In the following sections, we will empirically examined the validity of these theoretical predictions.
3 Data
To examine the effects of trade liberalization on labor demand elasticities at the firm level, we use
three data sets. The first data set is from the World Trade Organization (WTO), from which we
obtain China’s tariff data at the HS six-digit level for year 2001–2006. Because the tariff data for
China is unavailable for year 1999–2000 in the WTO, we supplement tariff data for the missing years
using World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) software maintained by the World Bank. The 1996
HS codes (for tariff data 1999–2001) are matched to the 2002 HS codes using concordance table from
the United Nations Statistics Division. We then use the concordance from the National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS) of China and convert the HS six-digit codes to the 2002 four-digit Chinese industrial
classification (CIC).
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Following Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), we construct the input tariff in sector s as a weighted
average of tariffs for the goods that sector s procures:
input tariffst =
∑
j
ωsj × tariff jt, ωsj =
inputjs∑
j inputjs
, (13)
where inputjs is the value of intermediate inputs from sector j to produce the unit value of output
in sector s. Thus, the weight ωsj is the input share from sector j in the total input in sector s. The
data for inputjs are from the China’s Input-Output Table for 2002.
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The second data set comes from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) conducted by the
NBS of China for the 2000–2006 period. These surveys covered all state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
and non-SOE firms with annual sales above 5 million Chinese yuan (about US$827,000). The data
provide more than 100 variables, including firms’ basic information (e.g., address, industry affiliation,
and ownership) and financial variables from accounting statements (e.g., employment, wage bills,
sales, materials, fixed assets, and export). The unit in the surveys is a firm (not a plant), but the
number of firm identifiers indicates that over 95% of all observations in the sample are single-plant
firms.
Following Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012), we link the ASIF data over the sample
period and construct firm-level panel data. Basically, we use unique firm official identifications given
by the ASIF to link firms over the period of 2000–2006. For firms that receive a new identification
as a result of restructuring, mergers, or privatization, we use as much information as possible on
firms’ name, street address, industry code, and etc. to link them over the sample period.
To mitigate the potential effect of low quality data, we clean the sample as follows. First, we
delete observations with missing values such as gross output, sales, labor, materials, and fixed assets.
Second, firms with fewer than eight workers are dropped since they are highly likely to suffer from the
lack of proper accounting system. Third, we drop observations where total assets are less than liquid
assets/net value of fixed assets; or annual depreciation is less than accumulated depreciation. After
these filtering procedures, we obtain unbalanced panel data in which the number of manufacturing
firms varies from 100,600 in 2000 to 206,801 in 2006.
Firm’s wages are calculated by dividing each firm’s total wage bill by the number of employees.
However, the wage bill may underestimate true labor costs because it exclude firms’ non-wage
6We assume a zero tariff for non-tradable goods.
9
payments to workers (Qian and Zhu (2012)). We measure total wage bill as the sum of firm’s wage
bill and employee supplementary compensation such as bonus and insurance.
The ASIF reports nominal values of output and material costs. To convert them into real terms,
we use the sector-level ex-factory price index for output and the input deflators for material costs.
These two price deflators are constructed by Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012).
The ASIF does not contain information on firm’s fixed investment, but provides the book
value of firm’s fixed assets at original purchase prices (BVFA). Since the reported book values
are the sum of nominal values from various years, they should not be used directly. To re-
trieve real capital stock, we first calculate firm’s real capital stock at birth year and then use
the perpetual inventory method as Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012). Specifically, the
real capital stock of firm i in the founding year tf is BV FAi,tf = BV FAi,ta/(1 + rps,ta )
tf−ta ,
where BV FAi,ta is the book value of fixed assets when firm i first appears in year ta in the
data set. rps,ta = (BV FAps,ta/BV FAps,1993)
1/(ta−1993) is the geometric-average nominal capi-
tal stock growth rate at province(p)-sector(s) level calculated from 1993 (the earliest year that
the authors can obtain nominal fixed assets data) to the year that the firm is first observed
in the data (from 1998 and onwards). Given firm’s real capital stock at birth year, we adopt
the perpetual inventory method to calculate the real capital stock of firm i in year t as follows:
Ki,t = (1 − δ)Ki,t−1 + (BV FAi,t − BV FAi,t−1)/pt, where δ = 0.05 is the depreciation rate as
calibrated by Song and Wu (2013), and pt is the investment deflator constructed by Perkins and
Rawski (2008).
The third data is transaction-level trade data from China’s Customs General Administration
over 2000–2006 (the maximum sample period that the authors have access to). The data report
information on import and export values and quantities at the HS eight-digit level for each trading
firm, by destinations (over 200 countries), firm ownership, customs regime (ordinary and processing
trade), and means of transportation. To identify firm’s customs regime, and whether a firm conducts
importing, exporting and both, we rely on information from the transaction-level trade data. Because
the coding systems are different between the ASIF and the trade data, we merge the two data sets
based on firm identifiers such as company name, address, zip code, and phone number. About 70%
of export value and 57% of import value are successfully merged to the ASIF data. About 66% of
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trading firms in the trade data are merged.
4 Empirical Specification
Our theoretical discussions in Section 2 emphasize that if the elasticity of substitution between
labor and the composite of intermediate inputs is greater than one, tariff reductions for imported
intermediates would raise the constant-output labor demand elasticity through decreasing the factor
share of labor. The preceding studies often used log-linear specifications of the labor demand function
to estimate elasticities of labor demand (e.g., Slaughter (2001), Krishna, Mitra, and Chinoy (2001),
and Hijzen and Swaim (2010)). However, the log-linear specification is not appropriate for examining
our theoretical implications because the embedded production technology is a Cobb-Douglas. Thus,
to investigate the effects of trade liberalization on labor demand elasticities, we employ a two-stage
approach as Fabbri, Haskel, and Slaughter (2003) and Senses (2010). The first stage estimates labor
demand elasticities at the firm level from a flexible cost function. Then, the second stage regresses
the estimated labor demand elasticities on variables of our interest, such as tariffs on intermediate
inputs.
4.1 Labor demand elasticities
For empirical specification, we employ a translog cost function with a second order approximation:
ln c = α0 +
∑
m
αm lnwm + αy ln y +
1
2
∑
m
∑
n
γmn lnwm lnwn +
1
2
γyy(ln y)
2
+
∑
m
γmy lnwm ln y + θzz +
1
2
θzzz
2 +
∑
m
θzmz lnwm + θzyz ln y, (14)
where c is total cost, wm and wn are factor prices of labor (L), capital (K), and intermediate
inputs (M), y is output, and z is the index of technology. As is well-known, this functional form
is sufficiently flexible, allowing for non constant returns to scale, nonlinear expansion paths, and
biased technological change.
Differentiating Equation (14) with respect to the log of wages (lnwL), we obtain the factor share
of labor sL as follows:
sL = αL +
∑
n
γLn lnwn + γLy ln y + θzLz. (15)
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In the first stage, our interest is to estimate the coefficient for the log of wages, γLL. Assuming
that firms within the three-digit industry face the same prices with respect to capital and intermedi-
ate inputs, we then estimate Equation (15) for each three-digit industry with the following empirical
specification:
sLit = β0 + β1 lnwageit + β2 ln yit + λi + ηt + ǫit, (16)
where subscripts i and t denote firm and year, respectively. sLit is firm i’s share of wage bill in
its total cost. Firm i’s wage, wageit, is calculated by dividing its total wage bill by the number
of employees. yit is firm i’s real output. λi is firm-specific fixed effects, controlling for all time-
invariant differences across firms. ηt is year-specific fixed effects, controlling for macroeconomic
shocks common to all firms including sectoral-level technological change. ǫit is the error term.
To calculate sLit, the total cost is defined as the sum of total wage bill, user cost of capital, and
material costs (payment to intermediate inputs). The user cost of capital is obtained by multiplying
the investment deflator in Perkins and Rawski (2008) by the sum of the interest rate and the
depreciation rate. The interest rate is taken from People’s Bank of China and the depreciation rate
is set to be 0.05.
Using the estimates from Equation (16), we calculate the constant-output labor demand elasticity
εit as follows:
εit =
βˆ1
sit
+ sit − 1, (17)
where the hat notation means estimation. It is noteworthy that the aforementioned estimation
procedure assumes firms’ cost minimization behavior. We assume cost minimization behavior for
non-SOEs. However, SOEs with state intervention do not necessarily make cost-minimizing choices
and their decision behaviors would be different from those of non-SOEs. Therefore, we estimate the
labor demand elasticities separately for SOEs and non-SOEs.7
7According to the definition reported in the China Industrial Economy Statistical Yearbook, SOEs include firms of
three types, i.e., domestic SOEs, state-owned joint venture enterprises, and state-owned and collective joint venture
enterprises.
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4.2 Effects of trade liberalization
To study the effects of tariff reductions on labor demand elasticities, we consider the following
empirical specification:
εit = δ0 + δ1input tariff s,t + δ2output tariff s,t + δXit + λi + ηt + µit, (18)
where input tariffs,t and output tariffs,t represent tariffs for intermediate inputs and for final
goods in sector s, respectively. The coefficients for theses tariffs are of our main interest. The theory
in Section 2 suggests that tariff reductions in intermediate goods increase the constant-output labor
demand elasticity (δ1 is positive), while tariff reductions in the final goods do not influence the
constant-output labor demand elasticity (δ2 is zero). Xit is a vector of explanatory variables that
control for firm characteristics including the logarithm of productivity, age, capital-labor ratio, and
indictor variables for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).8 λi is
firm-specific fixed effects, ηt is year-specific fixed effects, and ǫit is the error term. To deal with the
potential heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation, we cluster the standard errors at the firm
level.
Furthermore, our theory in section 2 emphasizes that the effect of tariff reductions in intermediate
inputs on the constant-output labor demand elasticity would be more pronounced for productive
firms because such firms tend to use more imported inputs than unproductive firms. To test this
empirical prediction, we add the interaction terms to the regression in (18):
εit = δ0 + δ1input tariff s,t + δ2(input tariff s,t × TFPit)
+ δ3output tariff s,t + δ4(output tariffs,t × TFPit) + δXit + λi + ηt + µit, (19)
where TFPit represents the log of firm i’s total factor productivity (TFP).
4.3 Endogeneity of trade policy
The aforementioned empirical identification may be biased due to potential tariff endogeneity. Sev-
eral sources may cause the reverse causality between tariff reductions and the elasticity of labor
demand. For example, firms with low elasticities of labor demand would lobby the government for
protection, which may lead to high output tariffs. Alternatively, the government would use tariff
8We use the Olley-Pakes approach to calculate firm-level productivity.
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barriers to protect some industries with either high or low labor demand elasticities, which would
lead to a biased estimate of tariff reductions. To address the engogenity bias, output and input
tariffs should be instrumented although finding appropriate interments for tariffs is difficult. We
here follow Yu (forthcoming) and rely on one-year lagged output and input tariffs as instruments
to conduct instrumental variable (IV) regressions. The embedded idea of using one-year lagged
tariffs as instruments is that the government is unlikely to change tariffs rapidly because of political
pressures from interest groups.9
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Baseline results
Before proceeding the results of estimating equations (18) and (19), it is worthwhile to briefly report
labor demand elasticities estimated in the first stage. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the
sample data. The mean of estimated labor demand elasticities is −0.37 and the standard deviation
is 0.15. The existing studies report labor demand elasticities within similar ranges.10 Hence, our
estimates on labor demand elasticities take reasonable values.
Input and output tariffs greatly vary across the 4-digit CIC. Input tariffs range from 0.8% to
19.9% with the mean 6.9% while output tariffs range from 0.0% to 65.0% with the mean 12.9%.
Figure 1 plots labor demand elasticities on the vertical axis and tariffs on the horizontal axis (output
tariffs in the left panel and input tariffs in the right panel). At first look, tariff levels do not appear to
be correlated with labor demand elasticity although input tariffs show a weak negative correlation.
Table 2 reports the regression results from (18). The first column controls for time-invariant
firm specific effects and macroeconomic shocks common to all sectors. Whereas the coefficient for
output tariffs is close to zero and insignificant, that for input tariffs is positive and significant. Since
tariffs are percentages, the parameter estimate of 0.0041 for input tariffs means that a 10 percent
9Examining Indonesian data, Amiti and Konings (2007) uses tariff levels at the first sample year as instruments.
The basic idea is the same: tariffs in later years are strongly influenced by those in the initial year because of political
pressures. However, our sample data correspond to periods during which China participated in the WTO and began
tariff reduction in various manufacturing products. Therefore, the tariff levels in the initial sample year may not
appropriately instrument tariffs in late sample years. Thus, we use one-year lagged tariffs as instruments.
10For example, constant-output labor demand elasticities reported by Fabbri, Haskel, and Slaughter (2003) that
studied indigenous and multinational firms in the U.K. vary from −0.40 to −0.26, depending on sample periods and
firms’ nationality. Go¨rg, Henry, Strobl, and Walsh (2009) report constant-output labor demand elasticities from −0.27
to −0.22 for Irish manufacturing plants. With respect to labor demand elasticities at the industry level, Hijzen and
Swaim (2010) report figures from −0.50 to −0.37 using the sample data for OECD countries. Senses (2010) estimated
the US labor demand elasticities at the industry level and obtained about -0.5 in the long-run and -0.2 in the short-run.
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reduction in input tariffs would raise the elasticity of labor demand by 0.041 (more elastic). If the
elasticity of labor demand starts from the mean of the data (i.e., −0.37), it would increase to −0.41.
When input and output tariffs are instrumented, the results are close to those without instrument
variables (the second column).
Although the first two regressions are consistent with our theoretical predictions, the degree
of fitness is quite low. Thus, we add several control variables to regression (columns 3 and 4).
Regardless of the use of instruments, the coefficients for input tariffs remain positive and statistically
significant. Furthermore, they are slightly higher (more elastic) than those without the control
variables.
The coefficients for TFP are negative, which implies that productive firms tend to have more
elastic labor demand than unproductive firms. The result is consistent with one of our theoretical
predictions. By contrast, the coefficient for capital intensity K/L is positive: firms with high capital
intensity tend to have less elastic labor demand. Although its interpretation is not straightforward,
one possible explanation is that firms with high capital intensity employ more skilled workers (or
non-production workers) because of the complementarity between capital and skilled workers. In
fact, the literature on skill-biased technological change theoretically and empirically shows that
capital upgrading stemming from technological progress would generate labor demand skewed toward
skilled labor (e.g., Doms, Dunne, and Troske (1997)). Because of the data availability, we cannot
separately estimate labor demand elasticities for skilled and unskilled workers (or production and
non-production workers). However, the existing studies agree that labor demand elasticities are
higher (more elastic) for production workers than non-production workers (e.g., Slaughter (2001),
Hijzen and Swaim (2010), and Senses (2010)). Hence, the regressor of capital intensity may capture
the effect of high ratios of non-production workers on labor demand elasticities.
We also introduce dummy variables for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and multinational enter-
prises (MNEs). As is discussed earlier, it is highly likely that SOEs do not purse cost minimization
as much as private enterprises. In the context of the elasticity of labor demand, SOEs may not
quickly adjust their employment levels in responce to wage changes. Thus, SOEs’ labor demand
elasticities are expected to be less elastic than private firms’ labor demand elasticities. The results
in Table 2 support our hypothesis on SOEs: the coefficients of the SOE dummy variable is positive
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and significant (columns 3 and 4). The dummy variable for MNEs is motivated by the preceding
studies that examined whether multinationals’ affiliates had larger labor demand elasticities than
indigenous firms. The received wisdom is that multinationals’ labor demand is more elastic than
indigenous firms because multinationals are likely to access production inputs (labor and/or inter-
mediate goods) in foreign countries more easily than indigenous firms. Indeed, the existing studies in
general found that multinationals’ labor demand elasticities were larger than indigenous firms.11 In-
terestingly, our estimates are negative but statistically insignificant, that is, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that multinationals’ labor demand elasticities are not different from indigenous firms’.
It is likely that labor markets are geographically separated because of transportation costs in-
curred by workers. This implies that if employment regulations vary across regions, the rigidity of
labor markets also would vary (Hasan, Mitra, and Ramaswamy (2007)). Unfortunately, regional-
level indexed of labor market regulations are not available. Thus, we control for regional differences
in labor market rigidity by province × year fixed effects. Furthere, these dummies also absorb any
other province-level shocks over the sample period. Estimation results are reported in columns 5
and 6 in Table 2. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively not different from those without
province × year fixed effects.
5.2 Sensitivity
To check the robustness of the effects of tariff reductions on labor demand elasticities, we estimate
alternative specifications of regression equation in (18). Specifically, the data allows us to categorize
sample firms into multi-product firms, processing-trade firms, and pure exporters. Holding other
firms’ characteristics constant, these firms may have different labor demand elasticities. Multi-
product firms tend to have large production scale which may help to use imported inputs. Our
theory suggests that holding other things constant, such firms are likely to have larger labor demand
elasticities (more elastic labor demand). Thus our results in Table 2 may be largely driven by such
11Fabbri, Haskel, and Slaughter (2003) studied manufacturing plants located in the U.K. and found that multi-
national plants had larger increases than domestic plants in the elasticity of labor demand for production workers.
Navaretti, Checchi, and Turrini (2003) examined firm-level data for eleven European countries, and concluded that
multinationals’ affiliated adjust employment more quickly than indigenous firms because multinationals are “foot-
loose.” Go¨rg, Henry, Strobl, and Walsh (2009) examined whether labor demand in multinationals’ affiliates becomes
less elastic if they have backward linkages with domestic firms. Their findings are that while multinationals do have
more elastic labor demand than domestic firms, the local backward linkages tend to decrease labor demand elasticities
in multinationals.
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firms. Processing firms are also likely to access imported inputs more easily than non-processing
firms. Because foreign firms that subcontract their production process to a processing firm usually
provide the processing firms with necessary parts and materials. Pure exporters in our sample are
those that export their final products but do not use imported intermediate inputs. Thus, input
tariff reductions may not be important for pure exporters.
Table 4 in the Appendix reports the results from cases in which we exclude these three types of
firms one by one. In essence, all regression results reveal that the results in Table 3 are not driven by
multi-product firms or processing firms. In addition, the exclusion of pure exporters from the sample
does not alter the main results quantitatively although we expect higher coefficients for input tariffs
in such subsample regressions. This may be due to a relatively small portion of pure exporters.
5.3 Heterogeneous effect on labor demand elasticities
Another important theoretical prediction is that the effect of input tariff reductions on labor demand
elasticities is more pronounced for productive firms. Table 3 reports the results of estimates in
regression equation (19) that tests the prediction. We use three alternative specifications for the
interaction term: import dummy variable, import share, and firm productivity (TFP). All three
different interaction terms exhibit theoretically consistent and statistically significant coefficients.
Tariff reductions in imported inputs would raise labor demand elasticities further (more elastic)
when firms use imported inputs (columns 1 and 2). When we replace import dummies with import
share, the results do not change. The effect of input tariff reductions is greater for firms with higher
share of imported inputs. Furthermore, the interaction term with firm-level TFP shows positive
and significant in both FE and FE with instrument variable regressions. Therefore, our theoretical
prediction on the heterogenous effect of input tariff reductions on labor demand elasticities has
empirical validity.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the effects of tariff reductions on labor demand elasticities at the firm level.
In particular, we consider both input tariffs and output tariffs. For this purpose, motivated by
Amiti and Davis (2012) and Kasahara and Lapham (2013), we propose a simple heterogenous firm
model in which firms may export their products and use imported intermediate inputs. Firms are
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heterogenous in their productivity and only productive firms can export their final products and use
imported intermediate inputs because of fixed costs for export and import.
If the elasticity of substitution between labor and the composite of intermediate inputs is greater
than one, decreases in the price of the composite of intermediate inputs would raise constant-output
labor demand elasticities (more elastic) by lowering the factor share of labor. Productive firms
face lower prices of the composite of intermediate inputs relative to unproductive firms because
productive firms tend to use more varieties of imported intermediate inputs, which lowers the price
of the composite of intermediate inputs. Thus, our model yields the following empirically testable
predictions: i) holding other things unchanged, more productive firms are likely to have higher
conditional labor demand elasticities than unproductive firms; ii) input tariff reductions increase
constant-output labor demand elasticities more for productive firms; and iii) output tariffs do not
affect constant-output labor demand elasticities.
To test these theoretical predictions, we construct Chinese firm-level panel data over the 2000–
2006 period. Our sample data correspond to the period of China’s WTO accession, and tariffs
declined in a broad range of manufacturing sectors at various speeds in the sample period. Our
empirical study generally supports these predictions.
18
References
Amiti, M., and D. R. Davis (2012): “Trade, Firms, and Wages: Theory and Evidence,” The
Review of Economic Studies, 79(1), 1–36.
Amiti, M., and J. Konings (2007): “Trade Liberalization, Intermediate Inputs, and Productivity:
Evidence from Indonesia,” American Economic Review, pp. 1611–1638.
Baldwin, R. (2006): “Globalisation: the Great Unbundling (s),” Economic Council of Finland,
20(2006), 5–47.
Brandt, L., J. Van Biesebroeck, and Y. Zhang (2012): “Creative Accounting or Creative
Destruction? Firm-level Productivity Growth in Chinese Manufacturing,” Journal of Development
Economics, 97(2), 339–351.
Chiquiar, D. (2008): “Globalization, Regional Wage Differentials and the Stolper-Samuelson The-
orem: Evidence from Mexico,” Journal of International Economics, 74(1), 70–93.
Doms, M., T. Dunne, and K. R. Troske (1997): “Workers, Wages, and Technology,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112(1), 253–90.
Fabbri, F., J. E. Haskel, and M. J. Slaughter (2003): “Does Nationality of Ownership Matter
for Labor Demands?,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2-3), 698–707.
Feenstra, R. C., and G. H. Hanson (1999): “The Impact of Outsourcing and High-Technology
Capital on Wages: Estimates for the United States, 1979-1990,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
114(3), 907–40.
Go¨rg, H., M. Henry, E. Strobl, and F. Walsh (2009): “Multinational Companies, Backward
Linkages, and Labour Demand Elasticities,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 42(1), 332–348.
Hamermesh, D. S. (1993): Labor Demand. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Hasan, R., D. Mitra, and K. Ramaswamy (2007): “Trade Reforms, Labor Regulations, and
Labor-demand Elasticities: Empirical Evidence from India,” The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, 89(3), 466–481.
Helpman, E., and P. R. Krugman (1985): Market Structure and Foreign Trade. The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Hijzen, A., and P. Swaim (2010): “Offshoring, Labour Market Institutions and the Elasticity of
Labour Demand,” European Economic Review, 54(8), 1016–1034.
Kasahara, H., and B. Lapham (2013): “Productivity and the decision to import and export:
Theory and evidence,” Journal of International Economics, 89(2), 297–316.
Krishna, P., D. Mitra, and S. Chinoy (2001): “Trade Liberalization and Labor Demand Elas-
ticities: Evidence from Turkey,” Journal of International Economics, 55(2), 391–409.
Melitz, M. J. (2003): “The Impact of Trade on Intra–Industry Reallocations and Aggregate
Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, 71(6), 1695–1725.
19
Navaretti, G. B., D. Checchi, and A. Turrini (2003): “Adjusting Labor Demand: Multina-
tional Versus National Firms: A Cross-European Analysis,” Journal of the European Economic
Association, 1(2-3), 708–719.
Perkins, D. H., and T. G. Rawski (2008): “Forecasting China’s Economic Growth to 2025,”
in China’s Great Economic Transformation, ed. by L. Brandt, and T. G. Rawski, pp. 829–86.
Cambridge University Press, New York.
Qian, Z., and X. Zhu (2012): “Misallocation or Mismeasurement? Factor Income Shares and
Factor Market Distortions in China’s Manufacturing Industries,” Working Paper, University of
Toronto.
Rodrik, D. (1997): Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Institute for International Economics,
Washington, DC.
Senses, M. Z. (2010): “The Effects of Offshoring on the Elasticity of Labor Demand,” Journal of
International Economics, 81(1), 89–98.
Slaughter, M. J. (2001): “International trade and labor–demand elasticities,” Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 54(1), 27–56.
Song, Z. M., and G. L. Wu (2013): “Identifying Capital Market Distortions,” mimeo.
Topalova, P., and A. Khandelwal (2011): “Trade Liberalization and Firm Productivity: The
Case of India,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(3), 995–1009.
Yu, M. (forthcoming): “Processing Trade, Tariff Reductions and Firm Productivity: Evidence from
Chinese Firms,” The Economic Journal.
20
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Labor demand elasticities 641, 240 −0.37 0.15 −0.63 −0.01
Input tariff 641, 240 6.89 2.95 0.84 19.91
Output tariff 641, 240 12.88 8.22 0.00 65.00
Import dummy 641, 240 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Import share 641, 240 0.06 0.20 0.00 1.00
(log) TFP 641, 240 0.66 0.30 −4.83 8.86
(log) K/L 641, 240 3.82 1.21 −6.20 9.51
(log) age 641, 240 2.05 0.90 0.00 5.83
SOEs dummy 641, 240 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
FIEs dummy 641, 240 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Note: Observations with labor demand elasticites belong to between the 1st and the
99th percentiles are reported. Input and output tariffs are in percents.
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Table 2: Tariff Reductions and Labor Demand Elasticities
Baseline More controls Province-year dummies
Labor demand FE IV FE IV FE IV
elasticities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Tariff −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0001 0.0000 −0.0001 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Input Tariff 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
(log)TFP −0.0406∗∗∗ −0.0406∗∗∗ −0.0413∗∗∗ −0.0413∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0013)
(log)K/L 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
(log)age 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0014)
SOEs dummy 0.0471∗∗∗ 0.0470∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0021)
FIEs dummy −0.0021 −0.0021 −0.0020 −0.0020
(0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0024)
Firm fixed effect Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effect Y Y Y Y N N
Province-year N N N N Y Y
F-test for excluded (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗
instruments
Observations 641,240 532,267 641,240 532,267 641,240 532,267
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 3: Imports, Tariff Reductions, and Labor Demand Elasticities
Import dummy Import share Firm TFP
Labor demand elasticities OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Tariff * Import dummy −0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Input Tariff * Import dummy 0.0012∗∗ 0.0009∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Output Tariff * Import share −0.0004 −0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Input Tariff * Import share 0.0020∗∗ 0.0014∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0007)
Output Tariff * (log) TFP 0.0002 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Input Tariff * (log) TFP 0.0015∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004)
Output Tariff −0.0001 0.0000 −0.0001 0.0001 −0.0002 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Input Tariff 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0035∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Import dummy −0.0018 −0.0017
(0.0029) (0.0023)
Import share −0.0047 −0.0036
(0.0052) (0.0042)
(log)TFP −0.0406∗∗∗ −0.0406∗∗∗ −0.0406∗∗∗ −0.0406∗∗∗ −0.0539∗∗∗ −0.0556∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0029)
(log)K/L 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
(log)age 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0014)
SOEs dummy 0.0475∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.0471∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0021)
FIEs dummy −0.0023 −0.0024 −0.0022 −0.0022 −0.0020 −0.0020
(0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0024)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-test for excluded (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗
instruments
Observations 641,240 532,267 641,240 532,267 641,240 532,267
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 1: Labor Demand Elsticiteis vs. Input and Output Tariffs
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A Labor Demand Elasticities
We use the market clearing condition for a variety of the final goods and two first-order conditions
for profit maximization. They are given by
ϕF (L,M) = Q(p), (A.1)
αpϕFL = w, (A.2)
αpϕFM = Pm, (A.3)
where α ≡ (η−1)/η is the inverse of the markup rate. Partially differentiating these three equations
with respect to w, we obtain
ϕFL
∂L
∂w
+ ϕFM
∂M
∂w
= −η
Q
p
∂p
∂w
, (A.4)
αϕFL
∂p
∂w
+ αpϕ
[
FLL
∂L
∂w
+ FLM
∂M
∂w
]
= 1, (A.5)
FM
∂p
∂w
+ p
[
FML
∂L
∂w
+ FMM
∂M
∂w
]
= 0, (A.6)
where η ≡ −Q′(p)p/Q, FLL and FMM are the second-order partial derivatives and FLM , and FML
are the cross second order partial derivatives.
Since F (L,M) is linear homogenous, FLL = −(M/L)FLM and FMM = −(L/M)FMM . Further,
the elasticity of substitution between the two factors is given by σ = ϕFLFM/(QFLM ). With this
expression of σ, the second-order partial derivatives can be rewritten such that
FLL = −
M
L
ϕFLFM
σQ
, FMM = −
L
M
ϕFLFM
σQ
, and FLM =
ϕFLFM
σQ
. (A.7)
Applying (A.2), (A.3), and (A.7) to equations (A.5), and (A.6) and rearranging them lead to
ηQ
∂p
∂w
+ w
∂L
∂w
+ Pm
∂M
∂w
= 0, (A.8)
ασQ
∂p
∂w
−
M
L
Pm
∂L
∂w
+ Pm
∂M
∂w
=
ασpQ
w
, (A.9)
ασQ
∂p
∂w
+ w
∂L
∂w
−
L
M
w
∂M
∂w
= 0. (A.10)
Solving this system of equations with respect to ∂L/∂w and ∂M/∂w, we obtain
∂L
∂w
= −
L
w
[
pmM
αpQ
σ +
wL
α2pQ
η
]
, (A.11)
∂M
∂w
=
LM
αpQ
[
σ −
η
α
]
, (A.12)
where wL+PmM = αpQ is used. Thus, denoting the labor share by sL = wL/αpQ, the total labor
demand elasticity is given by
ηLL = −(1− sL)σ − sL
η
α
. (A.13)
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B Sensitivity Analysis
Table 4: Robustness Check
Multi-product firms excl. Processing firms excl. Pure exporters excl.
Labor demand OLS IV FE IV OLS IV
elasticities (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output Tariff −0.0001 −0.0000 −0.0001 0.0000 −0.0002 −0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Input Tariff 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
(log)TFP −0.0384∗∗∗ −0.0385∗∗∗ −0.0402∗∗∗ −0.0402∗∗∗ −0.0435∗∗∗ −0.0435∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0013)
(log)K/L 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0311∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0006)
(log)age 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0015)
SOEs dummy 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.0476∗∗∗ 0.0485∗∗∗ 0.0484∗∗∗ 0.0482∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0021)
FIEs dummy 0.0009 0.0009 −0.0022 −0.0023 −0.0026 −0.0026
(0.0041) −0.0031 (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0035) (0.0027)
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
F-test for excluded (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗
instruments
Observations 507,911 405,802 567,269 462,391 577,533 469,254
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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